Wade L. Robison's Commentary on "The Information Due to the Customer"
I
Christine should talk with Vernon. There are two different
issues that are raised by Vernon's not passing along either the
savings in cost of production or the information that the
custom made parts are to be made with a different material than
XYZ's engineers had originally thought would be necessary.
First, as Christine points out in her original conversation
with Vernon, "In most cases the performance will be virtually
the same--although some parts might not last quite as long." It
is unclear whether there are two problems here, or only one.
Christine may be saying both that some of the parts will have a
shorter lifetime than they would were they made of the other
alloy and that for some of the parts, or--and this is also
unclear--for some of the features of the parts, the performance
will not be the same as it would be for those made with the
other alloy. Either all the parts will be used in the same way,
but the failure rate will be higher in general (perhaps because
the parts are not as strong now), or, perhaps, some of the
parts will be used in ways different from other parts, and they
will not perform as well as ones made with the other alloy
would perform. In short, the parts will be of lesser quality
than those ordered, and that diminution in quality will
manifest itself either in a shorter lifespan for some of the
parts or in decreased performance for some of the parts, or
both.
In either event, ABC will be getting an inferior product for
its money. One way to come to understand whether anything moral
is at issue is to ask whether a change will cause any harm, and
ABC will be harmed because it will have to purchase new parts
sooner than otherwise, and that will cost them more money,
and/or because it will have an inferior product produced with
these parts because the performance with them will be inferior
to what would have been the performance expected of the part
made with the other alloy. So ABC will be harmed by changing
the composition of the parts, and anytime harm occurs because
of one's actions, one needs to assess whether one ought to act
in that way.
One ought not to cause harm unnecessarily, and so one needs
a good reason for causing it. Physicians have a good reason to
cause pain to patients by inoculating them because the patients
are benefited in the long term by being immune from diseases
that would cause them more harm. So the question is whether XYZ
has a good reason for causing harm to ABC. The answer is that
it has a reason, namely, increased profits, but that is not a
good reason for causing harm. Christine is right when she
thinks that "the customer isn't getting what was promised." If
I promise someone something, and then substitute something
else, I have broken my promise, and we thus have two harms
here--the harm that comes from breaking one's promise and the
harm that comes from causing ABC to spend more in the long run
for the custom made parts.
The harm that comes from breaking one's promise may seem a
minor harm, but think of what might happen were ABC to discover
that the reason the parts it ordered have a shorter lifespan
than it thought they would have is that XYZ has substituted
something different from what ABC thought it ordered. Not only
would ABC have the basis for a legal suit, presumably--if the
order originally included specifications for the alloy to be
used--but it also would no longer have any reason to trust XYZ
to deliver what was promised. Everything ordered would have to
be checked, that would increase ABC's costs, and it might
decide that the increased costs of doing business with XYZ were
not worth it and might take its business elsewhere. Breaking
one's promises often does not cost one much: if no one finds
out, and one generally keeps one's promises, then no one will
be the wiser. But when one is found out, the cost are usually
so high as to outweigh any advantage one may have had from
breaking the promise to begin with. So Vernon risks losing ABC
as a customer should ABC ever find out that the parts they
ordered are not exactly what they got.
But I mentioned that there were two different issues raised
by Vernon's actions. The second is perhaps somewhat more
problematic because it raises the question, "What is a fair
profit?" Is one entitled to charge whatever the market will
bear, or should one pass along any savings to one's customers
and charge only what gives one a decent profit for one's work?
We may bring out the issue more clearly by supposing that XYC's
suppliers find a new source for the alloy originally thought
necessary and that the price to XYZ is significantly lower than
what XYZ had calculated it would be in determining that the
final price should be $75 per part. Does XYZ have an obligation
to pass onto ABC the savings from their discovery? Suppose that
the savings are not, say, $2 per item, but $35 per item.
Whereas before XYZ was making a profit of, say, $20 for every
$75 item sold, now it is making a profit of $55 for every item.
Does it make a difference how much of a profit XYC is
making?
This question raises issues that take us far beyond this
case, but we can say a few things about it. One is that
discovering that one can purchase something at a cheaper price
is itself not without cost: one has to hunt in catalogues,
presumably, talk to suppliers, make new arrangements, cancel
old ones, and so on. So XYZ has incurred some costs in lowering
its costs, and it should be entitled to recoup those costs. It
thus is not obligated to pass on to ABC all of its savings in
purchasing the alloy at a lower cost.
But should, again, ABC ever become aware that XYZ made a
profit of $55 on every $75 item--and one must realize that,
among others, salespersons talk--then XYZ will get a reputation
for gouging. That is, they will become known as a company that
will make as much money as they can whenever they can. This
will have its effects on their business, for instance.
Companies will bargain that much the harder to lower the price,
thinking that XYZ will be making enough profit even with a
lower price, and XYZ will find itself having to mark up items
in order to have a bargaining position. It will thus price
itself out of the market for some potential customers, who will
see the price and not realize that XYZ is willing to bargain.
But even those who bargain with XYZ and come up with a contract
will be left not being completely sure that they came up with a
good contract. They will still wonder if, perhaps, XYZ has not
still made a big profit and will hunt around for other
suppliers. So XYZ will perhaps lose customers, who will feel no
loyalty to a supplier who will gouge when it can.
So, by all means, Christine ought to talk further with
Vernon. He is taking a short-sighted view--take the profits
upfront and do not worry about the potential long-term
consequences--and is causing harm to ABC when that is
wrong.
II
If Christine's entire further conversation with Vernon is as
reported and all he says is, effectively, that he is just doing
good business, then she ought to press the point further. He
presumably thinks he is doing "good business" because he is
making more money for the company from this contract than he
would if he passed along the savings to ABC, but he is making
more money only because he is supplying a different product to
ABC than was originally contracted for. Whether the contract
itself specifies the content of the part or not, it was
presumably presumed by both during the negotiations that a
particular alloy would be used. Or, to put the point perhaps
less contentiously, XYZ presumed it, and ABC would have no
reason for thinking any other alloy would be used. It is not
good business to cheat a customer, and that is effectively what
Vernon is doing.
He is also assuming, without evidence, that ABC will be a
satisfied customer. But if the parts are not as long-lived as
it thought they would be, and if there is a higher rate of
failure in some functions than it would there would be, ABC may
well not be a satisfied customer and may look elsewhere for a
supplier next time. It is not good business to encourage
customers to go elsewhere the next time they have to purchase
parts.
III
If the original contract specifies that the parts are made
from the alloy originally chosen, then Christine cannot sign a
report "verifying that the specifications for the part have
been met." They have not been met, and it is her professional
obligation to make sure that what is produced is what was
contracted for.
In addition, if the original contract is as indicated, then
it is probable that Vernon knew that all along. He is thus not
just taking advantage of a loophole in the contract by
substituting one alloy for another when the contact did not
make it clear what was necessary, but clearly breaking the
contract in order to increase the profits to the company. So,
whereas one might just think him slightly sleazy in trying to
wring as much money as he can from the contract, now one must
think him criminal in not only breaking the contract himself,
but also urging someone else in the firm to do the same--and to
cover for him. For if Christine signs the report, Vernon can
always claim, in his defense should things come to that, that
he just took the word of the engineer here, that she is the
professional who ought to know about such matters, and that he
is just the salesperson, or whatever, and certainly not
professionally competent to make such judgments.
So Christine cannot sign the report. That would break a
contract with XYZ, and it would open her to the legal
repercussions if XYZ should find out and sue, as they would be
entitled to do.
IV
If Vernon is able to get another engineer to sign the
report, Christine is in an awkward position because now, should
she act further, she will not only get Vernon, but also a
fellow engineer in trouble.
But she has an obligation to take the matter higher if for
no other reason than that the company may be sued by XYZ. It is
not enough morally just to act within the law, but it is always
a mistake not to act within the law. One pays in so many
ways--monetarily, by having to pay damages as well as for the
original difference in costs, and politically, as it were, by
being presented publicly as a company willing to cheat its
clients for extra profit.
That a fellow engineer may well be harmed is unfortunate,
but if he had a good reason for signing the report, despite the
discrepancy, he will give it, and if he did not, it is not up
to Christine to protect him when the company as a whole may be
harmed by his and Vernon's actions. One is not obligated to
protect a fellow profession from his or her own mistakes, and
the obligation is especially weakened when others may be harmed
by those mistakes. Christine now only has to be concerned about
the harm being done to XYZ, but also the harm that may be done
to ABC.
In addition, she may be harmed, knowing all this, and yet
not acting. We are sometimes in the unfortunate position of
coming to know something that necessitates our acting when we
would prefer not acting. Seeing a parent abuse a child, for
instance, creates a prima facie obligation to do something, and
one must at least consider what one ought to do in such a case,
perhaps investigating whether the abuse is longstanding or not.
Here the harm is clear, and that Christine is no longer in the
chain of authorization for its occurrence is not important.
What matters now is that she knows it. To prevent harm she must
act.
Cite this page:
"Wade L. Robison's Commentary on "The Information Due to the Customer""
Online Ethics Center for Engineering
8/17/2006
National Academy of Engineering
Accessed: Thursday, May 23, 2013
<www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Customer/CustomerRobison.aspx>