For Engineering and Science
Michael Pritchard
Commentary On
At the outset it is important to bear in mind a distinction between ideals we might believe research scientists should strive for and the actual context in which they currently conduct their research. I do not know what the overall importance the SMEL virus in this case study might have for public health, safety and welfare. From the standpoint of ideal scientific research, the greater its import for public health, safety and welfare, the stronger the argument for widespread cooperative research and the weaker the argument for keeping research findings secret.
"The Chance Meeting" describes two competitive research labs, both of which are at least partly staffed by graduate students under the supervision of senior researchers. In fact, the two labs are described as "Dr. John Smith's" and "Dr. Shirley Frank's," suggesting research settings in which proprietary claims are made in regard to research results. One might wish for a less competitive, less proprietary research setting, but that is an ideal rather than the reality of this case. My commentary will focus on the ethical problems inherent in the competitive research setting described.
Dr. Smith has set the tone for the viral conference to be held at a nearby university; since many "competitors" will be attending, nothing is to be said about the results generated in his lab. This rule seems severe even in a competitive setting. After all, this is a conference, where, presumably, some information is to be shared. Furthermore, Smith's lab has already learned some results from Frank's lab (i.e., that SMEL protease may be able to cleave protein X). Nevertheless, Smith has instructed everyone to say nothing about their lab results.
What could be said in defense of Dr. Smith's stance? One possibility is that the lab results are not well developed or secure enough to be shared. Another is that, as head of the lab, Dr. Smith believes that he should report all lab results. His rule might be an attempt to control the information coming from his lab. Finally, it is relevant to consider the sources of the funding for Dr. Smith's lab. He may have special responsibilities to the funding agencies, especially if they are private agencies.
However, Smith's basic attitude could be simply competitive and proprietary, quite apart from any special obligations to funding agencies.. As head of the lab, Smith may feel a responsibility to keep the lab "afloat" - even more, to be "Number 1." Presumably, considerable money, time and work have been invested in the lab's research. "We cannot afford to be too charitable," Smith might urge. "Others should not be allowed free access to what we've discovered through hard work." Of course, other participants at the conference might reason similarly, raising the question of why a conference is being held at all. Denial of free access is not the same as complete denial of access. Still, Dr. Smith may be insisting on reciprocal exchanges of information, and, as head of the lab, he may have been telling researchers in his lab that they should not be sharing lab results without first obtaining his approval.
To Lisa's credit, she did go to Dr. Smith to ask if she could share their tentative findings about strain B with her old high school friend. Why did he refuse? It could be that, so far, only "preliminary data" have issued from Lisa's work; such results should not be released prematurely, Dr. Smith might have thought. It could be that Dr. Smith did not see Lisa's sharing as a reciprocal exchange. Admittedly, Steve Jones had told her enough about his somewhat similar research that she realized he was using strain A (without success) rather than strain B. However, that was not useful information, since Lisa already knew that strain A was not successful. Dr. Smith might ask, "What's the mutual gain here? None. So why should we help another lab move ahead in this competitive environment? Would they do that for us?"
Lisa might still think that Dr. Smith is being unreasonable. But her only apparent motive for suggesting strain B to Steve Jones is that Lisa and Steve were old friends in high school, although they haven't seen each other since. Giving an old friend from high school a break might seem like a good thing to do, but Lisa's action may well harm her lab (if it falls behind competitively) as well as damaging her relationships of trust with Dr. Smith and other members of the lab. She has not claimed that this information should be shared for the overall good of society (advancing our common store of knowledge in fighting disease, e.g.). It seems more a matter of pleasing an old friend. If Lisa wants to share information with Steve in order to support higher scientific ideals, then she should advance this argument to Dr. Smith and her lab associates. However, that does not seem to be her driving concern. I conclude that she made a wise, and morally defensible, decision in refusing to share her results with Steve.
A further question is whether fear of retribution (from Dr. Smith) is a good reason for Lisa not to share her results with Steve. It probably is a realistic fear. If Lisa is motivated only by fear of retribution, that suggests a failure to see the morally valid reasons for not sharing her results with Steve.
If fear of retribution is the main reason Lisa and her colleagues do not share their lab results with others, that suggests that the lab atmosphere is not what it should be. Perhaps Dr. Smith should have open discussions of how their findings should be handled and why. Graduate students should be invited to discuss Dr. Smith's views - even to challenge them if they seem too restrictive for scientific research. But it is in such discussions rather than in individual situations outside the lab (such as meeting an old high school friend) that challenges should be made. Meanwhile, Lisa should not take matters into her own hands and tell her old friend the "secrets" of her research.
Commentary On
I will comment on aspects of this case sequentially, in the order in which they are presented. Some of my comments will be about the ethical issues themselves; some will be about whether the case is plausible, clear, etc.
I begin with paragraph one. Although it is typically allowable for professors to engage in some work beyond their regular employment at a university, restrictions are usually imposed (perhaps a percentage of one's workweek). That in itself suggests that taking on additional work raises a yellow flag. It appears that Jones has not been monitoring himself well in this regard -- nor, apparently, has anyone else. This situation is an open invitation for trouble, particularly of the conflict of interest variety, as the case later bears out.
The case states that Jones gets a sabbatical to develop his business. That seems unlikely, unless the university has determined that it has some particular stake in this business. It would be good to spell out the understanding and why the university finds this arrangement agreeable. This detail might result in a somewhat different description of Jones's work on his business. If, however, Jones has been granted a sabbatical to work on something else but finds himself consumed with the establishment of his business, we have a problem of a different sort. Jones committed to doing one thing but ended up doing quite another. Another way to change the case would be to have Jones taking a leave of absence (without pay) from the university to set up his business.
Whichever way the case goes, I should think that some understanding would have been established in relation to Jones's advisees. The case seems to leave this issue completely unresolved, so it is difficult to determine just what obligations Jones has. (E.g., when I was beginning to work on my dissertation, the person I wanted as supervisor was about to take a sabbatical leave. He recommended that I select a different supervisor, while volunteering to look at anything I might send him during his absence. I regarded this offer as an act of generosity on his part rather than an obligation. However, if Jones has already assumed the role of dissertation supervisor, he has an obligation, which requires him, at the very least, to help Jim get appropriate supervisory help.)
It isn't entirely clear how Jim got himself tied into Jones's outside work. Has the department sanctioned this arrangement? Why? With what understanding? I think we need more background on Jim's circumstances. Perhaps both the department and Jones are misusing Jim.
Is there something special about Jim being in his seventh year? If I read the case correctly, he had already put in five years of graduate work before Jones took his sabbatical. Isn't that an unusually long time to spend in a graduate program without having gotten further along on one's dissertation? Is there a suggestion here that Jim may not have been applying himself as well as he should (in which case Jones may have some doubts about how serious Jim is about completing his thesis soon)? Or is it a typical timeline for science Ph.D.s? I think the case will be strongest if there is no suggestion that Jim has been setting an unusually slow pace.
The answers to the questions in paragraph three really depend on how we are to understand the first two paragraphs. However, assuming that at this point Jim's circumstances are clarified and Jones is shown to be negligent in providing Jim with the supervision he needs, Jim certainly is justified in seeking help from someone else in the department. Maybe Jones would regard Jim's talking with Smith as an attack on his (Jones's) authority. But that would not be a reasonable conclusion for him to draw (assuming he even knew about the conversation). I take it that Jim would first simply express to Smith his concerns about not being able to progress with his thesis, both because of Jones's demands on his time and Jones's inaccessibility. Whether Smith is the person Jim should talk to depends on whether Jim feels comfortable discussing such a delicate matter with him. Maybe Jim should talk with someone else first. If there is no one Jim feels he can talk to, that would be most unfortunate and might signal that something is wrong with the department itself. In any case, Jim needs to talk with someone, and he should summon up the courage to do it. If the entire department is a mess, what does he have to lose? If Jones is the only problem, there should be a solution (unless Jim is not a good candidate).
I think the questions in Part 2 are quite good, especially if some of the questions I have asked about Part 1 are cleared up. I wonder, however, how readers will understand the statement that Jones's recent grant application was denied. Just how is that supposed to bear on Jim's circumstances? If the grant had been awarded, would Jim have been supported by it (or would Jones have selected someone else)? I think it would be helpful to say a bit more about this point.
A lot is packed into this case, and the issues raised are important. My main concern is that readers need enough information to focus clearly on what is going on as they consider the ethical issues.
Commentary On
Part 1
At first glance, it seems appropriate for Dr. McClair to suggest to Peggy that she do some of her experiments in Dr. Gleeson's laboratory. The lab was well set up for the experiments, and Peggy would have the advantage of working with another set of researchers. In all, it seems that Peggy will benefit a great deal from this arrangement.
However, at second glance, some questions should be raised. Just what is the relationship between McClair and his collaborator? Was McClair thinking primarily about how Peggy's work might benefit from working with Gleeson, or was he thinking more about how he and his collaborator might benefit? This issue is complicated by the tension that seems to exist between McClair/Gleeson and Peggy's adviser, Dr. Jones. Jones apparently told Peggy that she was reluctant to have Peggy visit Gleeson's lab because her work paralleled McClair/Gleeson's to a significant degree. We seem to have colleagues in competition within the same academic department. At least Jones is reluctant to share her own (and Peggy's) unpublished results with McClair/Gleeson. We are not told whether McClair/Gleeson are similarly reluctant. In any case, a possible reading of the scenario is that McClair/Gleeson are prepared to gain access to Jones's work via Peggy. If that is a plausible reading, then McClair's motives are highly questionable even if it should turn out that Peggy's work is strengthened. Essentially, she is being viewed more as a resource by McClair/Gleeson than as a student they are helping to complete a successful dissertation. We might wonder if McClair has a conflict of interest.
Similar questions might be raised about Jones's position. Presumably, Peggy's aim is to complete her research and write a successful dissertation. Jones, as her adviser, has a responsibility to advise her well in the pursuit of these ends. Working with Gleeson may be in Peggy's best interest but contrary to Jones's interests. We need to ask whether Jones has a conflict of interest.
To her credit, Jones does alert Peggy to her concerns, However, it seems that the burden is placed on Peggy to work out whatever problems this arrangement might pose, since it is Peggy, not Jones, who confers with McClair/Gleeson about Jones's concerns. The McClair/Gleeson response is puzzling. They assure Peggy that her going to the London lab is "a collaboration and that she should definitely be willing to share her research." At this point it would have been advisable for Peggy to get this assurance from Jones as well. Better, Jones, McClair and Gleeson should have conferred in order to clarify, to their mutual satisfaction, what Peggy's role would be; and their understanding should have been communicated clearly to Peggy before she was expected to decide whether to go to London.
Unfortunately, Peggy is caught in the middle. This is not a problem of her making; yet it seems that she has been given primary responsibility for working it out. At this point, it seems that neither Jones nor McClair/Gleeson have exhibited appropriate sensitivity to Peggy's best interests. I would give them low marks as advisers.
Part 2
The fact that Peggy received a preprint of the paper from Gleeson's lab indicates that the lab acknowledges Peggy's helpfulness on the project. Whether she deserves a listing as co-author is the key question. If they did, indeed, use a protocol that Peggy had established as part of her dissertation, it seems that she might have a case for being listed. At this point she should consult with both McClair and Jones. They should be in a good position to assess the strength of her contribution, and they are thoroughly familiar with the standard criteria used in establishing author lists. As a collaborator, McClair should be familiar with the work of the Gleeson lab; and, as one of Peggy's advisers, he should be willing to fight for whatever she is due. Jones, as Peggy's main adviser, should be willing to go to bat for Peggy, and she will not have the constraints McClair might feel because he collaborates with Gleeson.
Part 3
Gleeson's reasons for not including Peggy as co-author are questionable, as stated. If Peggy's protocols were used, that might be a basis for co-authorship even if she did not conduct the experiments herself. Presumably there are other authors who did not conduct these experiments. Gleeson's claim that they were planning to do these studies prior to Peggy's arrival might be true in a general sense. The question is whether she contributed in some more specific way to the success of the experiments (by offering her protocols, e.g.). If the answer is negative, then we need to ask why Gleeson sent her the preprint, with its acknowledgment of her help. Just how did she help? Finally, it isn't clear how listing Peggy would detract from the merit of a post-doc in the lab who was applying for jobs. But even if it did, that does not seem to be relevant to the issue of whether Peggy should be listed. In fact, if that is the true reason she was not listed, the other reasons offered seem to be a smoke screen.
Part 4
Sadly, Peggy's plight in Part 4 is evidence that things went badly for her from the outset. Basically, McClair and Jones attempt to bail out, leaving Peggy on her own. It is unreasonable to think that, as a graduate student, Peggy could have anticipated where all of this might lead. Clearly, it was in her best interests to have the terms of her work in the London lab spelled out in advance as much as possible. Jones should have been insistent on Peggy's behalf. That would have required her to talk directly with McClair and Gleeson. McClair and Gleeson should have been as explicit as they could be with Peggy from the outset. A sign that things might not go well is that, even at this initial juncture, full responsibility seemed to be placed on Peggy to attend to all these matters; yet, of all the parties in this story, she was the least prepared to handle such responsibility.
Commentary On
This case nicely illustrates how complicated joint research and publication can become. A good ethical rule of thumb, I think, is for collaborators to have open lines of communication with each other on matters related to their research. Dividing things into discrete parts and treating each part as if it has no relation to the others (or the persons responsible for those other parts) does not work well when the various parts also compose a whole (as they do in this case). Since Melissa, Sharon, and Adam are currently working on a project together, the rule of thumb seems to apply in this case.
If Melissa and Sharon were to bear this rule of thumb in mind, Adam would be contacted. Sharon seems to sense that. Melissa's is distracted by something that is, strictly speaking, irrelevant here -- her concern about her upcoming tenure review. It is understandable that she is concerned about the review, but she needs to detach herself from this concern in trying to determine how to proceed in her research with Sharon and Adam. The standards of appropriate research and obligations to fellow researchers do not change simply because of an individual's desire for a good tenure review, fame or money. The integrity of scientific research and accountability come first.
Melissa is setting some bad examples for Sharon. She is prepared to publish the "results" of research before it is completed (because "the book that contains this review paper will take a while to come out"). She is also prepared to publish these "results" without consulting with Adam, another major player involved in the research. If consulted, there is some possibility that Adam would not object. That would not mean that going ahead is all right, however. It would meet only one basic obligation (which follows from the rule of thumb outlined above). If Adam responds appropriately, however, he will object. Consulting with Adam offers two advantages for Sharon. First, not having the same vested interest in rushing things along, Adam can offer a more objective perspective on what it is appropriate to do. Second, Sharon will obtain the views of someone who, presumably, is equally, if not more, experienced than Melissa. (Adam is an associate professor, probably already tenured.) One would hope that Melissa is sufficiently experienced that she would see how questionable it is to publish "results" prior to the completion of the actual research. Unfortunately, she does not seem to. Sharon is uncomfortable about proceeding. She should be listening carefully to Melissa's attempts to justify publishing prematurely. None of her reasons really appeal to scientific justification. Instead, they refer to her professional ambitions and concerns (e.g., a positive tenure review). Sharon should go with her doubts and insist that Adam be contacted.
One thing that might make it difficult for Sharon to take the course of action I am recommending is that Adam is thousands of miles away, whereas she is face to face with Melissa. However, Sharon and Adam clearly will be working together on the project. Sharon should look ahead to how premature publication might affect that working relationship. Melissa is suggesting that they ignore Adam at this point -- that they say nothing. Will Sharon eventually have to say something (either lie or confess) at a later time? Today's actions have consequences down the road. Sharon would do well to consider the potential outcomes of her actions. What if Sharon and Adam discover later that they need to make an important change in their research, but that the "results" have already been published? Although science aspires to objectivity, it also must acknowledge contingency. Good science goes as the world goes -- not necessarily as scientists think it will when they are engaged in a promising (but by no means certain to be successful) research project. Sharon must ask not only what she may eventually have to say to Adam even if the research goes as she and Melissa think it will, but what she will have to say to Adam and other scientists who may have relied on her prematurely published work, should the research go differently.
Determining authorship can be tricky, especially in the sciences. Should Adam be listed as co-author of the review paper in question? Certainly not without his permission. But, given the complicated relationships among the researchers in this case, it seems to me that the rule of thumb I have suggested is all the more important. What is so difficult about taking a moment to consult with one's collaborators before proceeding? If Melissa is right about Adam's role in their joint research, presumably he will agree that it is Sharon's call (although he still might well object to what Melissa is proposing to Sharon). If he disagrees, that in itself is reason for Sharon to reconsider.
I think this case provides a very good opportunity to discuss scientific integrity and the various temptations that may place it in jeopardy. Especially troubling here the extent to which Melissa is driven by timelines that have no relevance to the research per se, only to her professional ambitions. Sharon is well advised to get the views of others in such circumstances.
Commentary On
Part 1
It is difficult to determine precisely what contributions each of the parties made in this scenario. Since everyone seemed quite satisfied until Fabio sought a patent, it seems that they had a satisfactory division of labor. Edgar, Doris and Mac co-authored papers on the advantages of their innovative sampling approach, and Fabio developed improved models of the sampling machine and began marketing the technology.
However, upon learning that Fabio was applying for a patent for the sampling machine, Edgar argued that his contributions warranted his name being included in the patent. He claimed that most of the ideas that went into the sampling machine were his. It is not clear what he could mean by this assertion. Edgar's role seemed to be to let Fabio know what his sampling needs were, review Fabio's drawings, and refine performance specifications. Fabio, in turn, designed and produced the sampling machine. Admittedly, without Edgar's input, Fabio would probably not have come up with the sampling machine he did, since the machine was designed to satisfy Edgar's research needs. But that, in itself, doesn't seem to warrant Edgar being listed in the patent. On the face of it, Edgar seems to be exaggerating the significance of his input. What could he mean by saying that "most of the ideas that went into the sampling machine" were his. Why, then, did he need Fabio? Is he suggesting that Fabio had virtually no creative input, that he was simply carrying out Edgar's design? Still, it is possible that Edgar provided enough input to warrant being included. We simply cannot tell from the scenario described so far.
Part 2
The first part of Part 2 seems to fall in line with the response outlined in Part 1. The significant addition in this segment is the reference to Edgar's "files." They might provide some support for Edgar's position. Unfortunately, they are neither signed nor kept in a notebook. Whether the contents of the "files" will ethically support Edgar's position depends on what they contain. Whether they provide legal support may depend on their being signed and in notebooks. If that is so, then the colleague may be sympathetic to Edgar's position but feel it is pointless to help him press his case legally. This segment points to the need for careful documentation of one's work.
Part 3
This is a case in which all parties would have been well advised to have a clear understanding from the outset of directions in which their work might go, how the work would be credited, and so on. It is unrealistic to think that all potential difficulties might have been anticipated. But it is not unrealistic to think that, as time passes, Fabio would want to move ahead without Edgar. If Edgar thinks he might have some stake in how Fabio proceeds, he should discuss this issue at the very beginning; the discussion of possible patents should occur earlier than a year after they have completed their work together.
What about the ethics of the case, as distinct from the legal questions? Here, it seems to me, a candid discussion of mutual expectations, possible future work and the like is important from the outset. Fabio is a vendor; he is in a business. Edgar is a university researcher. He may not have been ready to see himself in a business relationship with Fabio. However, once he tries to enter the world of patents, he is entering into the business realm. He would be well advised to give some attention to these matters earlier rather than later. This approach is fair both to himself and anyone with whom he enters into a business relationship.
Commentary On
This is a case in which universities who traditionally have collaborated in research find themselves unable, or unwilling, to collaborate as they move into the commercial market. This failure in collaboration comes at the expense of providing a more cost effective (and probably more environmentally friendly) service to the medical world and, ultimately, the public. These universities were able to move into this position because of NIH support in the initial phases of their research. That is, public monies have been used to create a stalemate between competing institutions. As described here, the universities were motivated to seek NIH support by the promise of lucrative returns.
Presumably, NIH support was intended to facilitate developing a new MRI technique that would enhance the ability of doctors to observe patients' brain function. Perhaps NIH saw the promise of financial gain as a necessary means to encourage further MRI research. But for NIH, the promise of financial gain for the universities was simply a carrot to encourage needed research, not a final end. In a capitalist venture for individual institutions, the universities had much to gain. However, by failing to insist that this research is not simply a capitalist venture for individual institutions, NIH apparently failed to take advantage of the opportunity to further the collaborative efforts of institutions that already had a good track record of collaborative work. This goal might have been accomplished by restricting the proprietary claims of NIH-supported institutions to the results of their research.
In the absence of NIH restrictions Huge and Ivy have emerged as intense, uncooperative giants, apparently with large appetites for financial gain and considerably smaller appetites for sharing their research gains in ways that enhance their commercial ventures.
Bearing this background in mind, I now turn to the specific questions raised by the case.
- Huge should not directly violate Ivy's patent rights. The fact that universities have been reluctant to sue to protect patents does not mean that they always will be, or that they will be in this case. Quite apart from the respective merits of the ethical arguments either side might produce, blatant disregard of patent rights is an open invitation for expensive litigation, and that is a battle that Huge will not win. Litigation costs, fines and the like are themselves ethically relevant considerations for Huge. The costs it would have bear in this case would be at the expense of other commitments the university has (to its faculty, students and the public).
- I should think that both Huge and Ivy have moral reasons for working very hard to try to reach working agreements to make the most cost-effective MRI process available for medical practice. These reasons derive both from their support from NIH and their public missions as universities. I would say that the universities' obligations are to both NIH and the public.
- I don't think that this case really raises the question of which is more important, human lives or intellectual property, at least not in the abstract. Instead, the case raises questions of responsibility. The seriousness of the responsibilities here pivots around the great value we attach to human life. However, there are limits to what sorts of demands we make on people (and institutions) to develop and market products designed to support human life. For example, we know that improvements in automobile safety can save human lives. However, that does not mean that automotive companies have an obligation to make cars as safe as is technically possible. Cars must be both affordable to the public and at least somewhat profitable to the companies. Minimum legal standards of safety may not always suffice, but there are also acceptable limits of safety that fall far short of saving as many lives as is technically possible. Although I believe that both Huge and Ivy have obligations to try to work out an agreement for public benefit, that does not mean that each has an unconstrained obligation to do so at any cost. That is not to argue that human life has less value; it simply means that there are limits to what can reasonably be expected. (I should add, however, that it appears that neither Huge nor Ivy has reached that limit.)
- This question is related to Question 1, but it is somewhat more complicated. As long as there is a reasonable chance that Ivy will eventually work out an agreement with Huge, Huge should not knowingly sabotage the deal by selling its systems to those it is known will violate Ivy's patent rights. That would kill any deal with Ivy, and it would invite the same sorts of litigation discussed in 1, only this time between Ivy and all of its other competitors. Short-term gains will probably give way to long-term losses. Huge needs to keep its eyes steadily on the morally desired end -- a cost-effective MRI process that will benefit doctors and their patients. Complicity (however legally acceptable) with others who are prepared to violate another's patent rights is not the moral high road; in fact, it's unlikely to be a successful road at all.
- If Ivy makes a serious effort to reach a reasonable agreement with Huge, but Huge remains uncooperative, it seems ethically acceptable for Ivy to provide the machine itself, provided that it will perform reasonably well despite its higher cost. If by "sub-par" means "unacceptably poor," then everyone should wait until a better quality MRI process is available.
- This question asks whether a company has the moral right to patent an idea for a specific process well after it has become public knowledge "among physicists and chemists who are not experts in this particular" field. If it is legally permissible, it is difficult to argue that it is not morally permissible in a case like this one. I don't know if it would be legally permissible. However, even if it is, not everything one has a moral right to do is morally right to do. Depending on the impact of asserting such a moral right on the availability and affordability of the MRI process, this distinction could be an important one to bear in mind.
Given the high level of toxicity of the oxidized form of jeckylhydium and its many industrial uses, it should not surprise Dr. Reams that the EPA is concerned about appropriate levels of human exposure to this heavy metal. Also, since her published research focuses on oxidation and reduction reactions of jekyllhydium, she should not be surprised that the EPA would seek her assistance in amending current regulatory limits.
It seems that, as an environmental chemist, Reams should at least be willing to meet with EPA officials to discuss their concerns. The case does not indicate whether Reams believes that there are others who are more expert than she in jekylhydium research. If she does believe that, then perhaps she could decline the EPA's request by referring the agency to someone more expert. However, if she believes her expertise matches or exceeds that of others, a strong case can be made for concluding that she should agree to advise the EPA. That does not necessarily mean that she should recommend that allowable limits for the total concentration of jekyllhydium be lowered. That is precisely the issue under consideration by the EPA. In effect, by refusing to offer her expertise to the EPA, she is leaving matters in the hands of those who know less than she does about an important area of public health.
Perhaps Reams was reasoning this way: "Our present state of knowledge about safe levels of exposure to jekyllhydium is insufficient to warrant any regulatory changes at this time. Therefore, I do not wish to involve myself in the EPA's attempt to rewrite the regulations." If so, it seems that she should have advised the EPA accordingly. Instead, she simply told the EPA that its task was "beyond the scope of her data and her expertise," that she could not make confident predictions.
In assessing her reluctance to get involved with the EPA, Reams might have asked herself this question: "What if all jekyllhydium researchers refuse to assist the EPA?" Then, obviously, the EPA would act without having access to anything but the published results of their research, and without the advantage of any of these researchers helping them interpret the significance of that research. Is Reams, as an environmental chemist, willing to accept that outcome? If she is not, and if she believes her expertise matches or exceeds that of others, then it seems that she should be willing to assist the EPA. She might not be comfortable being cast into the role of adviser to a policy-making agency, but neither should she be comfortable leaving matters totally in the hands of nonexperts.
Reams's rationale for declining the EPA's invitation raises important questions about standards of acceptable risk. She says she cannot confidently predict the extent of the oxidation reaction in diverse environmental conditions. Does that mean that acceptable concentration levels should not be lowered unless one can make confident predictions? That is the apparent stance taken in the asbestos industry in the early 1920s, and sustained for decades while workers were exposed to high levels of harmful asbestos fibers. The problem with this position was that asbestosis and related forms of lung cancer take 20 or 30 years to develop. Waiting for compelling evidence of the harmful effects of exposure was, in that case, fatal. Similarly, delayed response to the accidental mixing of cattle feed and fire retardant in Michigan in the mid 1970s resulted in enormous costs to farmers and widespread consumer fears of meat contamination.
These two examples do not warrant an alarmist response to risks of toxicity. But they do raise fundamental questions about the rationality of waiting to act until highly confident levels of predictability are obtained.
Finally, we are not told anything about Reams's place of employment. If she works in private industry, she may fear that she will undermine her employer by assisting the EPA. But that assumes that she will be advising the EPA to lower the acceptable level of concentration of jekyllhydium. She apparently is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to warrant that step. It is not clear why her employer would be upset if that were the advice given to the EPA. On the other hand, should Reams become convinced that the regulations should be changed, that is what she should advise the EPA. Furthermore, as our recent history of litigation suggests, it may be in the interests of the industry she represents to change its practices as well. In any case, Reams needs to consider not only her obligations to her employee, but also to the public at large.
If Reams is a university researcher, then there is even less reason for her to be reluctant to share her expertise with the EPA, as her obligations to public health and welfare are more direct. Again, that is not to prejudge the substance of her recommendations. It is only to affirm that one of higher education's functions is to serve the public interest, particularly in areas of public health where it may have expertise that others lack.
As it turns out, the EPA used Reams's expertise through her publications. However, Reams is concerned that her work was misused. The antidote, it seems, would have been for her to be there to assist the EPA in properly understanding her work.
An alternative scenario has Reams agreeing to work with the EPA, but her work is still misapplied. Here there is good reason for Reams to continue working with the EPA, trying to help the agency understand the greater complexity of the relevant chemistry. Precisely because of this complexity, her continuing research may reveal further evidence that will assist the EPA in its regulatory functions.
