Joseph Ellin

I

Alison is the junior member of the PNSCR, which has the responsibility of making a recommendation concerning continuing operation of a heat exchanger which is not functioning to standards. Nuclear Safety and Licensing has submitted an analysis justifying continued operation (JCO), but Alison has reservations about an assumption made by NSL; if the assumption is wrong, problems could occur, and NSL has not discussed that contingency. Should Alison express her reservations? The other members of PNSCR want to approve the JCO, and there is pressure that the recommendation be unanimous.

Alison should keep firmly in mind that as a professional engineer, her job is to provide her best professional judgment when called on to do so; she is not on the payroll in order to endorse decisions made by others. She finds herself in a tense political situation, where management looks for the 'correct' recommendation. But if she feels she has valid reservations about the JCO, which she can't express for political reasons, she would be subverting her function on the PNSRC. In effect, it is being suggested to Alison that her professional judgment isn't needed in this situation, which ought to raise the question in everybody's mind, why is she there? If she's not free to speak as her judgment dictates, she has no role on the PNSCR and ought to ask to be replaced on it.

Chair Robinson's comments about the cost to the company of not approving the JCO are entirely inappropriate and put the PNSCR under pressure. Perhaps the parameters of the PNSCR's mandate are not clear; are they supposed to make engineering judgments, or management judgments? It is up to management, it would seem, to consider the costs of delay in deciding whether to accept or reject PNSRC recommendations. Evidently the PNSRC in this company functions in part to cover management's decisions; by providing input management wants to hear, they relieve management of the necessity of making business decisions balancing cost versus safety. This attitude is reflected in the comment of Chair Robinson.

II

Alison expresses her reservations, and there is discussion. However her recommendation for further study is steamrolled by the committee. Should she vote against the approval, since the calculations she requested haven't been made? It is unclear what the hurry is here; if a committee member has reservations which could be clarified by a three hour study, why not make the study? Evidently most of the other committee members think Alison's reservations simply aren't important enough to bother with, which is certainly their prerogative. On the other hand, she has a different opinion, and as a competent professional she is entitled to hear some reason why the study is a waste of time. Evidently Mark Reynolds sees the point of Alison's concern, but his support is brushed aside, leaving the impression that the committee does not really like to hear disagreement among its members. The case does not present any serious discussion on the PNSCR about the contingency which worries Alison; her concern is brushed off with vague invocations of the company's excellent safety record (which this discussion on the PNSRC may be putting in jeopardy!).

Of course Alison could be wrong; perhaps she is inexperienced, and just doesn't realize that what she's worried about is the remote possibility of the failure of a redundant system ("lots of plants don't even have containment spray systems"), which shouldn't be taken seriously. Maybe she's a bit over her head on this committee! If so, she might be wise to listen and learn until she gets more experience. On the other hand, it is also possible that she lends a critical point of view which the committee evidently lacks. Her attitude of refusal to go along with the rest could save the committee from embarrassment some day. There is an air of self-confidence about the other members which could prove dangerous. Given that her recommendation has been rejected without serious discussion, she ought to vote No. Perhaps she's not entitled that the study be done, but she is entitled to a reasoned discussion and plausible arguments why the study shouldn't be made.

It is not stated why it is important that PNSRC decisions be unanimous. Perhaps the vaunted unanimity of past decisions is a consequence of political pressure and not engineering consensus? If previous unanimous recommendations have been the legitimate result of engineering judgments, then no precedent is created, because such unanimity does not exist in the current situation. On the other hand, if previous unanimity has been produced by pressure such as is being exerted on Alison, then the tradition of unanimity is hollow and ought not to be taken as a precedent. What is being decided by the PNSRC is how far one has to go in the interests of safety. This is a matter of judgment. In general, reasonable people can disagree about this question. In this case, the system is optional, failure is evidently considered remote (only a "possibility," a word which in context implies, "very unlikely") and there are said to be no "extraordinary" risks involved even if the exchanger does fail. Nonetheless it is surprising that all PNSRC decisions have been unanimous. If I were management, I would suspect a unanimous PNSRC as too good to be true; such unanimity would strike me as more than a little bit 'concocted'. However management isn't interested in such suspicions because unanimity makes management's job easier.

III

Therefore, I conclude that no matter what the ultimate outcome, Alison would be more at fault for taking the easy way out and going along with the majority, than for voting No. In any case, however, she ought to have a chat with other members of the committee and express disappointment that her judgment was not respectfully considered, and point out that the tendency of the chair to pressure engineering judgments is not in anybody's best interest. Unless she exerts herself and defends her professional competence and prerogatives, she is going to find herself more and more ignored and will come to be regarded as a fifth wheel on the wagon.

I

Ruskin Manufacturing has made a commitment which it evidently cannot meet. A component is in short supply and Ruskin cannot met its deadline to deliver completed machines to Parker Products by the 10th of the month. The problem falls into the lap of Tim Vinson, head of quality control. None of the options he thinks of seem particularly appealing. No explanation is given of why the component is in short supply, or why Tim doesn't find this out until the 8th, or whether he could or should have done something to assure that, short supply or not, his share of the components would arrive on time, except that he is said to "feel responsible" for not seeing the problem earlier. It is possible that he or someone has been negligent somewhere along the line; but it seems likely that the supplier is at fault for failing to deliver the components, which suggests that Ruskin has a lawsuit against the supplier and thus a means of shifting any penalty it suffers for failing to make timely delivery to Parker.

The case does not state exactly what is at stake for either Ruskin or Parker if Ruskin fails to deliver as scheduled. If there is only a money loss for both, Ruskin may be off the hook by shifting this to the supplier. This needs to be determined before any drastic action is taken by anyone. So if Tim doesn't know, he ought to find out first thing. First he ought to consult with the person in the company who's familiar with Parker and with Ruskin's contracts with both Parker and the supplier. This might be Arnold Peterson, or it might be someone else. If Tim doesn't have access to that person (how big a company is Ruskin, anyway?), he might find out who does and take it from there. The first requirement in solving a problem is to identify just what the problem is. As quality control officer, Tim would not seem to know enough to be able to reach a good solution on his own, unless he's very lucky!

Another option would be for Tim to call Parker and explain how things stand, and see what they say. Evidently he does not consider doing this, but the case does not explain why he doesn't. Perhaps Tim is not authorized to consult with Ruskin's customers. Or perhaps he thinks that's not his job. In that case, he should find out who is, because it is possible that one of the options Tim is considering, either (1) or (2), might satisfy Parker, who might not be so concerned with impurities, or with getting new components (option 2) when old components would meet minimal standards. Under this condition there is the possibility that Parker might want to renegotiate the contract or invoke a penalty, if the contract specifies such. Presumably Tim isn't the person in Ruskin who would know about this.

Another possibility is that Parker might simply prefer to wait until the specified components arrive. Or perhaps delivery with old components can be made now, and the new components installed at the site when they arrive. The problem is Parker's as much as Ruskin's, since they will either get their machines late, or receive machines which are not quite what they contracted for; and the decision between these choices should be up to them. Parker undoubtedly will not be happy with the news that the components haven't arrived, but they foreseeably will be more unhappy if they receive machines which aren't what they ordered.

The point is that Tim considers two options which would circumvent Parker and in effect deceive it about what it's getting. This is not only dishonest but holds out all sorts of promises of future trouble. Better to admit your failure, even if you're not really at fault--the lawyers can argue over this later--than try to cover it up. But assume that Tim knows, suspects, or discovers that Ruskin would have big problems if it fails to deliver the precisely specified machines at the time guaranteed. So he is reluctant to contact Parker without first trying to improvise something. His obvious next step is to consult with the design engineer, to assure himself that there is no remedy other than (1) and (2). Not being a design engineer himself, evidently, he needs to search for a third solution before acting. To act on his own without enlisting engineering help seems reckless.

II

Tim does the responsible thing and consults with the chief engineer, who ducks the problem and passes the buck back to Tim. Chuck should lose a few points for surly non-cooperativeness. However he seems to have confirmed that there is no third engineering option, which is what Tim wanted to find out. There is still the option of contacting Parker. Tim can either take action himself or inform the next level up, which is Vice President Arnold Peterson. Perhaps Arnold will not be happy to have this brought to his attention; evidently there is some reason to suspect that officers at Ruskin company prefer not to know about problems in their company.

But any decision Tim makes commits the company to a line of action which is potentially damaging, might involve a law suit, loss of customer confidence, etc. So he has to decide whether he wants to take this responsibility himself, or whether it properly belongs at a higher level. Tim ought to realize that he does not know enough about what is really at stake for him to make the decision himself whether or not to contact Parker. If in fact Ruskin is protected in its contract with its supplier, Arnold might know this or be able to find out. An assessment of the risk needs to be made by someone in a better position than Tim. So however uncomfortable he feels, Tim really has no choice but to consult with someone else at Ruskin, and this seems to be Arnold.

III (Version 1)

Tim calls Arnold. (a) Arnold's stupid and irresponsible reply gives Tim the green light to do whatever he wants, although "just meet the deadline" presumably means he is not to call Parker. Arnold doesn't tell Tim just what is at stake for Ruskin if the deadline is not met, but his reply certainly suggests that the stakes are higher than Ruskin wants to risk. Thus Tim is effectively excluded from calling Parker. Arnold has in effect committed Ruskin to a conspiracy to deceive Parker and violate its contract. Does Tim want to go along with this and choose one of the 'redesign' options, or does he want to go around Arnold and try and find someone with more sense? The uncooperativeness of both Chuck and Arnold makes it seem as if Ruskin might be a company in which no one has any sense! (Tim might be part of this, since he never considered talking to Parker in the first place). In that case, Tim had best go along with the bosses, unless he is interested in looking for a job elsewhere.

Since option (2) involves least risk to Parker, if Tim isn't interested in challenging Arnold, he should opt for this. In effect, Arnold has ordered him to do so. However Tim cannot feel he is off the hook because of the vague way in which Arnold put his instructions. Tim could still do the right thing and contact Parker himself; he would not be countermanding a clear and direct order because Arnold only told him to 'take care' of the problem without consulting management.

Version (b). In this scenario, Arnold is much more forthcoming and gives Tim a clear order, and explains to him the reason for it. Tim now knows there is a lot at stake. Arnold accepts responsibility for faking the delivery to Parker. So from one point of view, Tim is definitely off the hook. He has made his report to management and been told to go ahead and fill the order despite not having the correct components. Arnold says he is unhappy with what they have to do, but he evidently doesn't see an alternative that would protect the company. The machines to be delivered, under option (2), meet minimum standards and will function well. So maybe it's reasonable to hope that Parker's customers will not lose out. If no great issues of safety or reliability are involved, Tim might very well conclude that he is not obliged to go beyond his position in the company and countermand direct orders, especially when Ruskin seems to have a lot at stake in making the delivery on schedule.

But Arnold's reason raises some very interesting ethical points. Should Ruskin as a company and Tim individually go along with Parker? In Arnold's opinion (how he knows this, he doesn't say), Parker is playing a very cute game with its own customers. They are willing to pass along inferior machines provided the customers don't know and can't blame them, Parker, if they do find out. Parker would seem to be guilty of culpable ignorance: deliberately overlooking a possible problem in order to pretend that you aren't responsible for it. This is unethical on Parker's part; but does Ruskin have an obligation to force Parker to act ethically by telling them about the problem, even if they don't want to know about it? I think it depends on just how serious a problem it is.

If Parker's customers were to have serious problems with the inferior machines, then Ruskin would be culpable for not informing Parker so that Parker could inform its customers. In this case, the substitutes meet minimal safety standards, and the fact that the substitution is probably going to be undetected indicates that the substitute machines function just as well as the ordered ones. The customers are harmed only by being deceived, and not in any other way. So assuming Arnold is correct in implying that relations between Ruskin and Parker would be soured if Ruskin informed Parker of the problem, Tim and Ruskin are probably justified in not doing so. It might even be argued that they are rather self-sacrificing in this course, since they would be protecting Parker by assuming all liability should Parker's customers find out about the switch and complain. One hopes that Parker appreciates this nobility on Ruskin's part.

Version (c). In this version, Arnold is out of town and 'cannot be reached.' Has Arnold left the planet? If so, who's doing his job while he's out in space? Since it's important that Tim consult with someone, Tim has the duty to find Arnold or someone else and get the advice and information he needs.

III (Version 2)

Tim does not call Arnold, because he thinks Arnold does not want to be bothered. Not calling Arnold is a mistake for the reasons given above, and Tim should have to expect to answer to Arnold for it. Why does no one in Ruskin Manufacturing want to accept responsibility for tough decisions? Tim might point out to Arnold the self-defeating corporate culture of 'don't bother the boss.' Since Arnold is a VP he presumably contributes to this. So he can't back-track now and complain that Tim didn't bring him this problem. However Tim might not find it expedient to say this. So he has little choice but to defend himself as best he can: that the components didn't arrive and he did the best he could. That the chief engineer informed him that there was no option anyway. That he considered informing Parker but didn't consider it wise to do so. That it is not too late to tell Parker now, if that's what Arnold wants, and offer to install the new components as soon as they arrive.

IV

The chickens come home to roost as Tim and Ruskin's luck turns bad. Tim has substituted the old components but the machines don't function as well as they are supposed to and Parker has discovered the substitution. Honesty might have proved the better policy. At the meeting to explain things to Parker, he has to put the best face on it: the components didn't come so he substituted something which ought to have worked just as well. Ruskin naturally will pay for damage, lost production, or whatever the loss to Parker has been. He had better ask to talk first to Arnold to make sure they have their signals together before seeing the Parker person.

V

Would it follow that Tim had acted appropriately if Parker never found out? No, it doesn't follow that Tim acted appropriately. It doesn't follow that he didn't either. Nothing follows from the fact that a questionable act is not discovered. Whether or not he acted properly follows from what's been said above.

Summary: evidently Ruskin's best course would have been to contact Parker and so Tim's course was to try to get an officer of Ruskin to authorize this. However possibly not contacting Parker could be excused if the stakes for Ruskin are sufficiently high and if the damage to Parker is sufficiently trivial. But Ruskin has to be prepared to pay the penalty for this course of action, should Parker find out about it.

I

II

III

IV

I

Co-op student Jack is given an important test to do and produces results that are too good to be believable; evidently he has faked the data. XYZ relies on Jack's results without confirming them and the consequence is that the tested component fails in operation, bringing down the units with it. Apart from the obvious point about faking data, the only ethical issue I see in this case is the questionable decision to assign an important test to a co-op student, and then to accept his results unconfirmed; but given the constraints on time in the department, this seems like a decision within management competence, and doesn't necessarily raise any ethical problem, even if it turns out to have been a mistake. No health or safety problems occur as a result of the units' failure, so the company is harming only itself by its loose supervision. Perhaps co-op student Jack ought to have been supervised more closely (especially in view of the importance of the project), but this too is judgment rather than ethics, and Jack's good record does not indicate supervision is required.

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II

Jack's supervisor relates his worry about Jack to Jack's professor. In general, before an accusation is made against someone to a third party, that person ought to be confronted with the charges and have an opportunity to explain himself. However the conversation with Dr. Thompson was presumably strictly confidential, and nothing is said to indicate that the questions asked by Tom were out of line. Tom is unsure of how to proceed and wants to discuss the question with someone who knows Jack better; also, Jack is no longer under Tom's jurisdiction. So if something is to be done, the ball has to be passed to the University. Further Tom's interest seems to be not punitive but correctional, since he puts his inquiries about Tom into a context of ethical training at the University (this could be a smoke screen of course). Since Jack has no current association with XYZ, the company is in the position of a victim of Jack's wrongdoing, not a prosecutor entrusted with dispensing justice.

For these reasons, Tom's move in talking to Dr. Thompson seems warranted. It's not clear what purpose would be served if Tom were to talk to Jack. Jack is now the University's problem. However if Dr. Thompson subsequently talks to Jack, Tom might be called in to produce the dubious data and explain his suspicions. What else happens depends on what comes before. First it's necessary to understand why Jack faked the data (if he did), and to make sure that Jack understands that doing so was wrong. Based on the information in the case, there's no reason to exclude Jack from XYZ in the future, assuming this problem gets cleared up and Jack's future trustworthiness is established, though such a reason might emerge after discussion with him.

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III

In hindsight, supervision of students is obviously not too satisfactory.

On the other hand, the department was busy and supervising a student whose previous work had been well done might not have seemed the best way to use time. Perhaps all co-op students should be closely supervised as a matter of course; I don't know enough about what they know or what they're supposed to do. Or perhaps Tom's initial response, to suggest that all students take ethics and be made to understand the importance of honest data, is the best solution.

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IV

So should State put in an ethics course? Yes. See this case for a reason why.

Like many engineers written up in ethics cases, Michael Green spends some of his time listening in on other people's conversations. These informal investigations never prove fruitless; Michael learns that Al House is abusing his company privilege of borrowing tools.

Al is far senior to Mike and Mike won't confront him directly. So he does the right thing and reports the abuse to proper authority. Al is not impressed by Mike's loyalty to the company and decides to determine who the stoolie is. He asks everybody directly which one 'ratted' on him.

Obviously XYZ company has walked into this by allowing Al to cross examine his subordinates. Evidently XYZ is not able to deal effectively with this abuse of policy. Al's boss should have made it clear to Al that the identity of the person who 'ratted' was confidential company information that he was not to attempt to find out; presumably Al is in enough hot water already not to want to disobey this order. And the other engineers in Al's unit should have been notified not to cooperate with Al if he should try to question them.

Is XYZ company really interested in preventing abuse of privileges? If they are, Michael would seem pretty secure in simply admitting to Al that it was he who turned him in. What can Al do about it, since presumably Michael is protected by Al's superiors? Any retaliation Al takes against Michael can be reported, and Al gets into deeper trouble. But if this seems too risky to Michael, he can refuse to answer, telling Al that he doesn't think it's an appropriate question to be put to a fellow engineer (which it isn't). Al can draw his own conclusions, but since he's clever enough to figure out that one of the other engineers in the unit might have turned him in and then lied about it, Michael's refusal to answer might not only protect Mike from Al's retaliation but might earn him a couple of points in Al's mind as someone who can't be easily intimidated. Meanwhile Michael should report Al's attempt at intimidation and make it clear that he expects XYZ to protect him if Al should retaliate. Michael is actually in the stronger position here and should make use of his advantage.

Instead, Michael lies to Al. There are cases in which lying is the only way out, but this doesn't seem to be one of them.