From Fundamental Physics to the Private Sector

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Question 5

Question 6

This case shows that ethical issues arise even when none of the parties involved commit obvious ethical violations.

It might be tempting to confine the study of ethics to situations in which one or more of the parties involved has committed some obvious violation of ethical principles. Once this stance is taken, many make secondary the study of ethics on the grounds that "the people I deal with on an everyday basis are reasonably ethical." This case reminds us that the study of ethics is important nevertheless, and should always be at the forefront of our thought process.

In this case, Huge and Ivy are confronted with ethical dilemmas even though both parties have operated in a manner that, at least at first glance, seems ethical. After all, both parties want to see the new MRI technique succeed, and neither party is hindering the progress of the other. This case also reinforces the fact that ethics plays an important role in fundamental science, despite the fact that its experiments are rarely conceived with a practical application in mind. Furthermore, it may remind us that the study of ethics doesn't always ask us to choose between a '"right" and "wrong" answer. This fact can be troubling to some scientists, and it is worth discussion.

It is also instructive to note that this case never focuses on one individual. Often our case studies revolve around interactions between individuals, which can lull us into believing that these are the only ethical situations that we need to look out for. One might argue that behaving ethically does not just involve doing what is right for one's own situation, but also involves understanding how ethical decisions are dealt with between groups.

We must be willing to approach ethics with forethought. It is not sufficient to just wait for a situation to present itself and then "behave ethically." Ethical behavior must involve understanding (or at the bare minimum, attempting to understand) what ethical decisions might lie ahead. In the end, the reader may note that the downfall of the parties involved in this case is not that they took an unethical step along the way, but rather that they failed to consider the ethics of their research before they began.

Question 1

The first topic this question is likely to raise is how a moral obligation to society differs from what is legally right (i.e., patent law). Too often, the two are deemed to be identical. Although one could argue that both parties have a moral obligation to society to mass produce the new technique, one cannot argue that the most efficient manner for either party to do so would necessarily be legal. Furthermore, this question is a good way to get students to think about the ultimate purpose of science. Is the ultimate goal of science to search for truth, to better society or to do something else? What do you do when the search for truth conflicts with bettering society?

Question 2

One interesting way to approach this question might be to ask. "Why do we call the funding we get for experiments 'grants'?" The word "grant" carries a connotation of "free money"; however, most would argue that grant recipients have some sort of responsibility to the entity that funded the research. At the vary least, scientists have the obligation to show that the money was spent wisely. If they fail to do so, they will not receive any more grants and will no longer be able to practice science.

Question 3

This is an especially interesting topic for scientists whose livelihoods depend on ideas that do not or have yet to bear practical applications. Many scientists' careers are based on developing abstract, entirely theoretical notions. Occasionally, these abstract theories will yield an application (either directly or indirectly) that is highly profitable. Some examples include the CD player, the internet and quantum computing. This question asks the reader how to maximize public gain from scientific applications without squashing a valuable reservoir of talent that could produce new, applicable science.

Question 4

This question requires readers to look beyond the ethical questions presented to them and instead examine how their choices place others in a situation where there is an ethical decision to be made. In other words, is it good enough to behave in a way that passes the ethical decision on to another party?

Question 5

This question asks readers to weigh the pursuit of truth, utilitarianism and patent law all at once. This discussion can be especially rich because many, if not most, of the ethical decisions that we must make require deciding between choices, all of which have good intentions. It is important to remember that the study of ethics is not only important when trying to decide between right and wrong, but also when deciding between two "right" options.

Question 6

At this point, the reader may ask about the four universities that did not emerge as players in this case study. After all, at least six universities contributed to the pool of basic science research that Huge and Ivy applied to new MRI techniques. What do Technological University, Private University, Popular University and Selective University deserve?

This is a case in which universities who traditionally have collaborated in research find themselves unable, or unwilling, to collaborate as they move into the commercial market. This failure in collaboration comes at the expense of providing a more cost effective (and probably more environmentally friendly) service to the medical world and, ultimately, the public. These universities were able to move into this position because of NIH support in the initial phases of their research. That is, public monies have been used to create a stalemate between competing institutions. As described here, the universities were motivated to seek NIH support by the promise of lucrative returns.

Presumably, NIH support was intended to facilitate developing a new MRI technique that would enhance the ability of doctors to observe patients' brain function. Perhaps NIH saw the promise of financial gain as a necessary means to encourage further MRI research. But for NIH, the promise of financial gain for the universities was simply a carrot to encourage needed research, not a final end. In a capitalist venture for individual institutions, the universities had much to gain. However, by failing to insist that this research is not simply a capitalist venture for individual institutions, NIH apparently failed to take advantage of the opportunity to further the collaborative efforts of institutions that already had a good track record of collaborative work. This goal might have been accomplished by restricting the proprietary claims of NIH-supported institutions to the results of their research.

In the absence of NIH restrictions Huge and Ivy have emerged as intense, uncooperative giants, apparently with large appetites for financial gain and considerably smaller appetites for sharing their research gains in ways that enhance their commercial ventures.

Bearing this background in mind, I now turn to the specific questions raised by the case.

1. Huge should not directly violate Ivy's patent rights. The fact that universities have been reluctant to sue to protect patents does not mean that they always will be, or that they will be in this case. Quite apart from the respective merits of the ethical arguments either side might produce, blatant disregard of patent rights is an open invitation for expensive litigation, and that is a battle that Huge will not win. Litigation costs, fines and the like are themselves ethically relevant considerations for Huge. The costs it would have bear in this case would be at the expense of other commitments the university has (to its faculty, students and the public).
2. I should think that both Huge and Ivy have moral reasons for working very hard to try to reach working agreements to make the most cost-effective MRI process available for medical practice. These reasons derive both from their support from NIH and their public missions as universities. I would say that the universities' obligations are to both NIH and the public.
3. I don't think that this case really raises the question of which is more important, human lives or intellectual property, at least not in the abstract. Instead, the case raises questions of responsibility. The seriousness of the responsibilities here pivots around the great value we attach to human life. However, there are limits to what sorts of demands we make on people (and institutions) to develop and market products designed to support human life. For example, we know that improvements in automobile safety can save human lives. However, that does not mean that automotive companies have an obligation to make cars as safe as is technically possible. Cars must be both affordable to the public and at least somewhat profitable to the companies. Minimum legal standards of safety may not always suffice, but there are also acceptable limits of safety that fall far short of saving as many lives as is technically possible. Although I believe that both Huge and Ivy have obligations to try to work out an agreement for public benefit, that does not mean that each has an unconstrained obligation to do so at any cost. That is not to argue that human life has less value; it simply means that there are limits to what can reasonably be expected. (I should add, however, that it appears that neither Huge nor Ivy has reached that limit.)
4. This question is related to Question 1, but it is somewhat more complicated. As long as there is a reasonable chance that Ivy will eventually work out an agreement with Huge, Huge should not knowingly sabotage the deal by selling its systems to those it is known will violate Ivy's patent rights. That would kill any deal with Ivy, and it would invite the same sorts of litigation discussed in 1, only this time between Ivy and all of its other competitors. Short-term gains will probably give way to long-term losses. Huge needs to keep its eyes steadily on the morally desired end -- a cost-effective MRI process that will benefit doctors and their patients. Complicity (however legally acceptable) with others who are prepared to violate another's patent rights is not the moral high road; in fact, it's unlikely to be a successful road at all.
5. If Ivy makes a serious effort to reach a reasonable agreement with Huge, but Huge remains uncooperative, it seems ethically acceptable for Ivy to provide the machine itself, provided that it will perform reasonably well despite its higher cost. If by "sub-par" means "unacceptably poor," then everyone should wait until a better quality MRI process is available.
6. This question asks whether a company has the moral right to patent an idea for a specific process well after it has become public knowledge "among physicists and chemists who are not experts in this particular" field. If it is legally permissible, it is difficult to argue that it is not morally permissible in a case like this one. I don't know if it would be legally permissible. However, even if it is, not everything one has a moral right to do is morally right to do. Depending on the impact of asserting such a moral right on the availability and affordability of the MRI process, this distinction could be an important one to bear in mind.